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Abstract
It is argued that there is no evidence for causality as a metaphysi-
cal relation in quantum phenomena. The assumption that there are no
causal laws, but only probabilities for physical processes constrained by
symmetries, leads naturally to quantum mechanics. In particular an argu-
ment is made for why there are probability amplitudes that are complex
numbers. This argument generalizes the Feynman path integral formula-
tion of quantum mechanics to include all possible actions that are allowed
by symmetries, but only the lowest order terms are observable at the
presently accessible energy scales.
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1 Introduction: Causal Laws and Wave-Particle
Duality
The world-view that the universe is governed by precise causal or dynamical
laws, which was called the paradigm of laws [1], was due to Galileo, Descartes,
Newton and others. The rst indications that this paradigm may not be valid
already appeared during Newton’s study of light. Newton had formulated a
highly successful set of laws for material particles, known today as Newton’s
laws of motion and gravitation. Contrary to Newton’s famous statement, \hy-
potheses non ngo", the assumption that the material particles should obey
these laws, or any laws, was a hypothesis. It was natural for Newton to then try
to bring the behavior of light into this paradigm, which he has helped to create
more than anyone else. So, he made the hypothesis that light consisted of ma-
terial particles, called corpuscles. This was convenient for Newton because then
these corpuscles are subject to the same laws of motion which he has already
‘perfected’.
However, Newton’s theory of light ran into problems almost immediately. It
could not explain partial reflection, as Newton himself recognized. Why is that
when a corpuscle encountered a slab of glass, it was sometimes transmitted and
sometimes reflected? To explain this using the deterministic laws of motion of
Newton, it was supposed at rst that there are ‘holes’ and ‘spots’ in the glass, so
that if the corpuscle encountered a hole it went through and if it struck a spot
it was reflected. This is perhaps the rst of the patchwork theories of physics
that were proposed in order for physicists to remain within the paradigm of
laws, which will be done all the way to the 21st century. But Newton himself
realized that this theory does not work. This was because, as Feynman [?] has
mentioned, Newton made his own lenses and mirrors by polishing glass. And
he knew that the small scratches that he made with powder as he polished glass
had no appreciable eect on the partial reflection of light.
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Newton’s hypotheses, in addition to not explaining partial reflection, could
not explain also interference and diraction, as is well known. Physicists tried
to solve these problems by abandoning Newton’s ontology of corpuscles, while
keeping his basic assumption that light obeyed deterministic laws. They should
have done the reverse! But I shall rst follow the historical route before dis-
cussing the logical alternative. Historically, physicists replaced Newton’s cor-
puscles with a wave. What made this appealing to them was that Huygens
had formulated a law for the propagation of a wave, called Huygens’ principle,
according to which every point on a wave front acted as a source of secondary
wavelets whose interference was sucient to reconstruct the subsequent wave-
fronts. This was the rst dynamical or causal law to govern the propgation of
a wave, as opposed to Newton’s laws that governed the propagation of material
particles. And using these laws and the new ontology that light is a wave it was
easy to explain all phenomena of light known at that time, including partial
reflection, interference and diraction.
But today we know additional phenomena that would make Newton’s on-
tology of light consisting of corpuscles appear to be fundamentally valid. For
example, if we make the intensity of light falling on a photographic plate low
enough we see spots appearing, which is interpreted as due to the corpuscles
of light, or photons as they are now called, striking the plate. Newton could
have saved his ontology for light by giving up his hypothesis that the corpuscles
should obey causal deterministic laws. Suppose in the above example of the
glass slab, 30% of the light is reflected and 70% is transmitted. Newton could
have postulated that a corpuscle has a 30% probability of being reflected and
detected in a detector and 70% probability of it being transmitted and detected
in a dierent detector. But Newton and other physicists were unwilling to give
up causal deterministic laws until the twentieth century when observed physical
phenomena made physicists question their cherished beliefs. I shall therefore re-
turn to the historical development of physics and consider Huygens wave theory
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of light, which kept physicists within the paradigm of laws.
The wave theory received a tremendous boost in the nineteenth century with
the introduction of electric and magnetic elds by Faraday and Maxwell. These
elds obeyed causal deterministic laws that were mathematically formulated by
Maxwell. Moreover light waves were recognized as special cases of this electro-
magnetic eld, and Maxwell’s laws justied Huygens’ principle. The price paid
now for staying within the paradigm of laws was only that the universe had to be
regarded as a strange mixture of material particles and elds. Physicists lived
with this dual ontology even when an inconsistency was found between the two
sets of laws that governed material particles and elds. This inconsistency, rst
clearly recognized by Einstein, was that the symmetries of the laws of mechanics
that governed material particles were not the same as the symmetries of the laws
of the electromagnetic eld. Einstein required that both symmetries should be
the same, and asserted the primacy of elds over particles by requiring that the
laws of mechanics should be modied so that they have the same symmetries as
the laws of the electromagnetic eld. This was the rst time in the history of
physics that symmetries took priority over laws in the sense that the laws were
modied to conform to the symmetries. Moreover, the existence of universal
symmetries for all the laws of physics enabled the construction of a physical
geometry having the same symmetries, namely the Minkowski space-time.
2 Role of Symmetries in Eliminating Metaphys-
ical Relations
The Lorentz group of symmetries also eliminated the following three metaphys-
ical relations that existed prior to Einstein’s paper on relativity. 1) Newton’s
postulated \absolute space" (on the basis of his rotating bucket argument) or
the \ether" in which light waves propagated implied an absolute relation be-
tween two time- like separated events that have the same absolute position in
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this \absolute space". 2) Newtonian physics assumed that two events have the
relation of absolute simultaneity if they are at the same \absolute time". 3)
Newtonian physics allowed for causal relations to exist between absolutely si-
multaneous events. For Newton’s gravitational interaction, these were the only
causal relations. But since these three relations are not Lorentz invariant (rela-
tion (1) is not even Galilei invariant), and therefore not an objective property
of the world, they were discarded. The overthrow of (3), which Newton himself
regarded as unnatural, meant that, since any pair of space-like events is simul-
taneous in an appropriately chosen inertial frame, and all inertial frames are
related by the Lorentz group of symmetries, the resulting acausality needed to
be extended to all space-like separated events.
In order to eliminate such metaphysical relations in general, I now formulate
a principle, called M : A necessary condition for a relation to be admissible as
an objective relation in a physical theory is that it should be invariant under the
symmetries of the theory. This condition would also be sucient condition in a
purely mathematical theory. However, for a physical relation to be admissible in
a physical theory, some empirical evidence in support of this relation would be
needed. On the basis of M , the metaphysical relation (1) of absolute position,
and hence absolute space, was not admissible even in Newtonian physics because
this relation is not invariant under the Galilei boosts that are symmetries of
this theory. But the other two metaphysical relations mentioned above were
invariant under the Galilei group of symmetries and therefore excluded only
because of the Galilei group was superseded by the Lorentz group of symmetries
as a result of the work of Lorentz, Poincare and Einstein.
However, there still remained the following metaphysical relation: 4) The
causal relation between two events that are time- like separated. But this re-
lation is asymmetric in time because while an earlier event a may influence a
later event b, it is not possible for the later event to influence the earlier event.
Even in a deterministic theory like classical electrodynamics, time asymmet-
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ric causality is introduced by the choice of retarded Green’s functions. This is
unlike Newton’s causal relation between simultaneous events, which is a sym-
metric relation because of Newton’s third law of motion, and invariant under the
Galilei group of symmetries. The physical theories we have today are invariant
under time reversal symmetry T, apart from weak interaction which is irrele-
vant to the problem at hand because causality is posited even in the absence
of weak interaction. Moreover, all theories of physics today, including weak
interactions, have CPT symmetry. Hence, the principle M , and time reversal
symmetry in the absence of weak interactions or CPT symmetry in the presence
of weak interactions imply that the metaphysical relation (4) of causality should
be discarded. Alternatively, if causality is to be kept then CPT symmetry or T
symmetry in the absence of weak interactions should be discarded. But while
people would agree that b cannot influence a, they would not accept the reverse
even though the intervening space-time region between a and b has the same
structure for both relations!
3 Indeterminism and the EPR Paradox
Eliminating causality means that a given event is not uniquely determined by
the ‘earlier’ events. Then there must be indeterminism in our physical theory.
But historically, physicists seriously entertained indeterminism, only after the
wave-particle duality was forced upon them. The work of Planck and Einstein
showed that it was necessary to associate particles with the electromagnetic eld,
vindicating the ontology of Newton. But at the same time, the eld included
the wave aspect. This wave-particle duality was recognized as characteristic of
all particles by De Broglie, and Schro¨dinger introduced the wave function that
obeyed Schro¨dinger’s equation to represent the wave properties. It appeared
then that this quantum wave obeyed a causal deterministic law. The relation
between the wave and the particle was given in probabilistic terms by Born:
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The probability density of observing a particle at x is j (x)j2, where  is the
wave function of the particle representing its state. More generally, the prob-
ability of observing this particle in a state  is j <  j > j2. This Born rule
may be generalized further by replacing the particle with any quantum system.
This rule is very well conrmed by experiment and is largely responsible for
the tremendous empirical success of quantum theory. Originally, this rule was
associated with an assumed indeterministic change from the state  to . Sub-
sequently, two dierent deterministic descriptions of quantum phenomena were
given by Bohm [5] (also called the causal interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics) and Everett [6]. But for these descriptions to be empirically relevant, they
need to give the experimentally very well conrmed Born rule. In the latter
two descriptions, however, probabilities are introduced ad hoc, which amount
to bringing the indeterminism of quantum mechanics through the back door.
I shall now show that, owing to this indeterminism, the correlation between
two entangled states, between which there is no causal relation, is metaphysically
similar to the correlation between two states that are related by Schro¨dinger
evolution. Consider two spin-half particles 1 and 2, which interacted sometime




( ↑(1) ↓(2)−  ↓(1) ↑(2)) (1)
where  ↑(1) is the spin-up state of particle 1 and  ↓(2) is the spin-down state
of particle 2 etc. The state (1) is spherically symmetric because its total spin is
zero; therefore the ‘spin-up’ and ‘spin-down’ basis states may be with respect to
any direction in space. As is also well known, it is not possible to communicate
using the entanglement between the two particles in (1) because they are non
interacting. Suppose Alice and Bob make measurements on particles 1 and 2,
respectively, and try to use their outcomes to communicate. If Alice observes
1 to have spin- up (spin-down) along the x−direction, she can predict with
certainty that 2 has spin-down (spin-up). Therefore, Bob by measuring the spin
along the the x−direction for 2 can verify the outcome of Alice’s measurement,
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provided Alice has informed Bob beforehand that she will measure spin in the
x−direction. But it is impossible for Alice to send a signal this way because
of the indeterminacy of the outcome of her own measurement. Suppose now
that Alice and Bob have decided before hand that if Alice measures spin along
the x−direction (y−direction) the signal she sends to Bob is ‘yes’ (‘no’). But
it is impossible for Bob to know which observable Alice has actually measured
because of the indeterminacy of the outcome of his own measurement. Thus the
indeterminacy of quantum mechanics prevents Alice communicating with Bob
using the entanglement in (1).
The inability to communicate signals faster than the speed of light c, and the
ability to communicate signals with speed less or equal to c is called Einstein
causality. We saw above that since quantum mechanics allows for entanglement,
the indeterminism in the outcome of measurements is essential to preserve Ein-
stein causality in quantum phenomena. People often wonder why non relativistic
quantum mechanics should preserve Einstein causality, which was obtained from
relativistic physics. However, the above argument that Alice cannot communi-
cate with Bob through entanglement without interaction applies to any two
degrees of freedom that are entangled. Alice’s and Bob’s measurements need
not be space-like separated events; Bob could make his measurement to the fu-
ture of Alice. And the two entangled degrees of freedom need not be separated
in space like the two particles above; they could be right on top of each other.
To prove this, it is sucient to note that the evolution of the reduced density
matrix 2 of particle 2 is governed entirely by the Hamiltonian of particle 2
because there is no interaction between particles 1 and 2. Therefore, whatever
measurement Alice makes on particle 1 would aect 1 but not 2. Hence, the
outcomes of Bob’s measurements on particle 2 that are determined by 2 are
unaected by Alice’s measurements.
Thus Alice’s inability to send a signal from event a to event b by means of
entanglement between two non- interacting systems is independent of whether
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a and b is space-like, time-like or null separated. However, Alice may send a
signal using the time-evolution of the wave function when a and b are time-like
or null separated. For example, Alice and Bob may agree beforehand to measure
a particular component of spin, say Sz, and that if Alice sends a spin-up (spin-
down) particle to Bob then Alice means yes (no). Suppose Alice wishes to send
the signal ‘yes’. She then measures a spin component on the wave function  
of a spin-half particle at time 0 in the neighborhood of a. If the outcome is
spin-up she does nothing, but if the outcome is spin-down she rotates it by 
radians to make it spin-up or she keeps measuring other spin-half particles until
she gets one in the spin-up state. Then she sends  (0) =  ↑ to Bob. During
the subsequent time evolution, no torques act on the particle. Therefore, due
to conservation of angular momentum, at time t,  (t) will have spin up. Bob
then measures Sz in the neighborhood of b that is in the future of a. He nds
it be in the state  ↑ with 100% proabability, and feels elated because Alice has
said ‘yes’.
However, if Alice had not communicated to Bob beforehand which spin-
component she will measure, Bob cannot determine the signal she had sent.
This is because the outcome of Bob’s measurement of the spin-component in
a general direction is indeterminate. Alice then would have to send a large
number of particles in the state  (0) at time t = 0 to Bob so that Bob may
statistically determine by means of his own measurements the signal that Alice
has sent. Even this would not be possible if Alice is not allowed to get around
the indeterminacy of her measurements and put her particle(s) in the state
 (0) =  ↑ as in the case of trying to communicate via entanglement mentioned
above. Hence the metaphysical connection, due to entanglement, between  ↑
and  ↓ is no dierent from the metaphysical connection, due to Schro¨dinger
evolution, between  (0) and  (t), because of the indeterminacy in the outcomes
of measurements of Alice and Bob.
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4 Physical and Metaphysical Causalities
It is necessary to distinguish between two types of \causality" at this point.
By metaphysical or deterministic causality will be meant the the relation be-
tween occurrences  and  that exists if the occurrence  always produces,
determines or necessitates the occurrence . But the ability to communicate
information, albeit probabilistically, may be called physical causality. More
precisely, physical or probabilistic causality is the relation between the occur-
rence  and occurrences 1; 2; 3; :::: that holds if given the occurrence of 
we can predict the probabilities of 1; 2; 3; ::::. In the examples in section 3,
if Alice and Bob do not agree beforehand to measure the same component of
spin, then Alice’s measurement, call it , does not necessitate the result  of
Bob’s measurement, whether or not these two measurements are separated by
a space-like, time-like or null intervals. So, there is no metaphysical causality
in all these cases. However, Alice can influence the probability of the outcome
of Bob’s measurements if Bob makes his measurements to the future of Alice,
but not when the two sets of measurements are space-like separated. This is an
example of physical causality.
Einstein causality states that there can be physical causality between time-
like or null separated events but not between space-like separated events. As
mentioned above, this is realized only probabilistically in quantum phenomena.
But Einstein himself was deeply attached to metaphysical causality, as shown
from his following statement: [7]
“... I should not want to be forced into abandoning strict causality without de-
fending it more strongly than I have so far. I find the idea quite intolerable that an
electron exposed to radiation should choose of its own free will, not only its moment
to jump off, but also its direction. In that case I would rather be a cobbler, or even
an employee in a gaming-house, than a physicist.”
It is ironical that Einstein who overthrew three of the four metaphysical
relations mentioned in section 2, could never give up the fourth metaphysical
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relation, namely causality.
The only way to experimentally test physical causality if by means of a large
number of trials of the form (; 1); (; 2); (3); ::::. The relative frequency of
each distinct pair in this experiment, as the number of trials tend to innity, is
the probability of occurrence of this pair. However, in a given trial, say (; 3),
we may ask, as Einstein does implicitly in the above statement, why is it that
 was followed by 3 and not 1; 2 or 4; ::? This absence of metaphysical
causality, due to the indeterminism in quantum phenomena, should make us re-
examine the meaning and validity of physical causality as well. Suppose Alice
sends a large number of spin-half particles in state , say the spin-up state, to
Bob. By doing experiments of the above form with a large number of trials,
Bob determines to a very high probability the state . This is possible in this
instance because of conservation of angular momentum that ensures that all the
particles are in the same spin state when they reach Bob. But this conservation
of angular momentum is due to rotational symmetry.
In general, conservation laws are due to symmetries. And if the state is not
an eigenstate of the conserved quantity then the conservation is realized only
statistically, i.e. the expectation value of the conserved quantity is preserved
in time. The equality of the expectation values of the conserved quantity at
two dierent times is therefore like physical causality, because of because of the
probabilistic manner in which they are both determined, and does not imply
metaphysical causality. But the symmetries are not probabilistic as far as we
know. Since causality is associated with dynamical laws, which give conservation
laws, this suggests that symmetries may be more basic than dynamical laws that
may actually be eective laws arising from symmetries.
It is often stated that Einstein causality is incorporated in quantum eld
theory by the requirement that eld operators at events that are space-like
separated are independent in the sense that they must commute if they are
Bosonic elds and anti-commute if they are Fermionic elds. I.e. if m(x)
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are the components of the various elds in the theory, where x stands for the
space-time coordinate (x; t), then
[m(x); n(y)]± = 0 (2)
whenever x and y are space-like separated. The  in (2) refers to anti-
commutator if the elds are Fermionic and commutator if the elds are Bosonic.
However, (2) does not require Einstein causality and may be introduced in
order that quantum eld theory is Lorentz invariant [8]. To see this, consider
the time evolution operator U for quantum states that is generated by the
Hamiltonian H(t) in a canonically quantized eld theory. Since H(t) represents
the total energy, and the locality assumption requires that this energy is the




where H(x) is the Hamiltonian density. It follows that
U = T exp(− i
h
∫






where T denotes the time ordering operation meaning that it orders the opera-
tors from left to right in the monotonically decreasing order of the values of their
argument t. This ordering is independent of the chosen Lorentz frame if every
pair H(xr);H(xs) commute whenever xr; xs are space-like separated. This is
guaranteed by the independence of elds at space-like separated events given by
(2). Thus ‘Einstein causality’ in quantum eld theory may be regarded as due
to the Lorentz group of symmetries. This is analogous to how the same sym-
metries discarded the metaphysical relation (2) of absolute simultaneity during
the creation of special relativity, as mentioned in section 2.
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5 What if there are no Causal Laws?
The metaphysical causality, mentioned above, was associated with the meta-
physical necessity of causal dynamical laws [1]. Therefore, since this meta-
physical causality was discarded above, it is no longer necessary to assume the
metaphysical necessity that is responsible for causal laws. An advantage of
discarding metaphysical causality is that the indeterminism of quantum phe-
nomena may then be deduced, instead of postulating it a priori. This solves
the statistical aspect of the measurement problem, mentioned in the statement
quoted from Einstein in section 4. The only causality which now remains is the
physical causality that is determined by the operator U , and which is realized
only probabilistically.
The above arguments suggest, however, that symmetries are more funda-
mental than physical causality. I shall therefore, from now on, assume A) there
are no causal dynamical laws. This implies that physical processes cannot be
deterministic, because there is nothing compelling a physical system to evolve
in a denite manner. It follows that we can only assign probabilities for phys-
ical processes, which is consistent with the experimentally observed intrinsic
indeterminism of quantum phenomena, as mentioned above. I shall assume also
that B) the probabilities of physical processes are invariant under a group of
symmetries.
According to classical physics, a particle goes from an event a to an event
b along a denite path that is determined by the laws of classical physics. If
we discard causal dynamical laws, in accordance with assumption (A), then the
particle need not take a denite path and all paths between a and b are equally
probable. If we suppose that the probability of the particle to go from a to
b, denoted P (b; a), is the sum of all these probabilities then, since there are
an innite number of equally probable paths, the probability of each path is
zero, and multiplying zero by innity will not give a sensible result. It is clear
therefore that there must be cancellation between dierent paths in order to
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obtain a sensible result for P (a; b). This may be achieved by introducing the
probability amplitude for each path that is a complex number. Adding these
complex numbers would then give the required cancellation. It is perfectly
possible a priori to have a physical theory that uses only real numbers, e.g.
classical physics. But such a theory would not satisfy assumption (A) above.
The question arises as to how we may obtain P (b; a) from the sum of prob-
ability amplitudes, denoted K(b; a). To answer this, consider the double slit
experiment and, for simplicity, suppose that there are just two paths, γ1 and
γ2 for a particle to go from an event a at the source to an event b at the screen
through slit 1 and slit 2, respectively. Then K(b; a) =  1 + 2 where  1 and  2
are the probability amplitudes for the paths γ1 and γ2, respectively. Now if we
observe through which slit the particle went through then
P (b; a) = P1(b; a) + P2(b; a); (3)
where P1(b; a) and P2(b; a) are the probabilities for the paths γ1 and γ2. But
if we do not observe which slit the particle went through then (3) need not
be satised, according to the above assumption. Indeed, experimentally, the
interference pattern on the screen conrms this. Hence, the observations on the
particle to determine which slit it went through should change  1 and  2 in
order that (3) is satised. Now
jK(b; a)j2 = j 1j2 + j 2j2 +  ∗1 2 +  ∗2 1 (4)
If we take P (b; a) = jK(b; a)j2 ; P1(b; a) = j 1j2; P2(b; a) = j 2j2 and if the
measurements change the phases of  1 and  2 then (3) would be satised in
the special case that measurements are made on the particles going through
the double slit. This is because these phases are dierent for dierent particles
and therefore the last two terms of (4) would be zero on the average. We shall
therefore take the probability to be the square of the absolute value of the
probability amplitude.
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Since all paths are equally probable, in accordance with assumption (1), it
follows that the probability amplitude assigned to an arbitrary path γ joining





Assumption (2) then implies that the probability jK(b; a)j2 is invariant under
the symmetry group. A sucient condition for this is that S is invariant under
the symmetry group. The highly successful Feynman path integral formulation
of quantum mechanics assumes (5) with S(γ) = Sγ=h, where Sγ is the classical
action for the path γ. Under this assumption it is easy to understand why
the classical limit corresponds to the particle taking the trajectory for which
S is an extremum: In the classical limit Sγ >> h for all possible trajectories,
but the amplitudes for trajectories far away from the trajectories cancel out
each other, while those in the neighborhood of the extremal trajectory add
constructively. Also, the above mentioned uncertainty in the phase when the
path which the particle takes is observed represents a way of treating, in the
Feynman formulation, decoherence which is usually treated in the Schro¨dinger
formulation by means of entanglement.
However, according to the principles (1) and (2) above, Sγ need not be re-
stricted to the classical action. Principle (2) may be satised if S has terms
in addition to the classical action that are also invariant under the symme-
tries. But the corrections to the amplitudes arising from these additional terms
should cancel each other except in extreme circumstances in order to be approxi-
mately in agreement with quantum mechanics that uses only the classical action.
Quantum mechanics maximally violates the laws of classical physics because the
classical laws constrains the particle to move along the classical trajectory for
which the classical action is an extremum, whereas quantum mechanics gives
equal probability to all possible trajectories. The present hypothesis maximally
violates the laws of quantum mechanics, as formulated by Feynman, by allowing
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S to contain all possible terms that are invariant under the symmetries.
An advantage of this hypothesis is that, as shown by Weinberg [8],it is pos-
sible for the divergences in the Feynman diagrams in eld theory to cancel
because we are including every term that is consistent with the symmetries in
the action. It is the lowest order terms that we directly observe at presently
accessible energies, which gives the illusion that the action contains only a nite
number of terms, as assumed in the paradigm of laws. The standard model, for
example, was formulated with a nite number of terms in the Lagrangian that
are invariant under the symmetries. But this Lagrangian, or any Lagrangian
that contains only a nite number of terms, denes an eective eld theory,
according to the present view.
From the present point of view the action is more fundamental than the ‘laws’
derived by extremizing the action, which has important physical consequences.
It implies that a given eld that obeys some law cannot be regarded as complete
unless this law can be obtained from an action principle, which may require
introducing other elds. For example, the electromagnetic eld strength F
obeys the Maxwell’s equations and the Lorentz force classically. But to obtain
these laws from an action principle, we need to introduce the potential A. And
the action that is a function of A then gave rise to new eects, such as the
Aharonov-Bohm eect. While the Aharonov-Bohm eect may be expressed non
locally in terms of the eld strength F , its generalizations to non Abelian
gauge elds cannot be expressed in terms of the Yang-Mills eld strength F i
even non locally.
The present approach appears to solve the riddle of why nature should choose
particular Lagrangians and not others for the laws. This is because, according
to the present view, all lagrangians consistent with a given set of symmetries
are allowed. Einstein famously said that laws are to the external world what
clothes are to the human body. This means that these laws or \clothes" may
be made to t the objective reality more and more closely but there is an
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unbridgeable gap between them. The purpose of this letter was to say that these
\clothes" are like the emperor’s new clothes. However, in the present approach,
symmetries replace the fundamental role previously played by laws. And the
‘laws’ are obtained from the symmetries, as eective laws, instead of the other
way around.
I thank Yakir Aharonov for useful discussions.
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